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and Mobolaj i Adenubi 's Splendid ( 1 9 9 5 ) — w i n n e r of the more pres-
tigious All-Africa O k i g b o Prize for Literature and a high contender for 
this year's N o m a A w a r d — c o u l d have enriched the palaver sauce of 
gender dialogue i n the same brief but insightful manner that Mart ina 
Nwakoby's A House Divided ( 1985) is treated. It would be interesting to 
read what interpretive correlation Professor Ogunyemi would have 
constructed between Emecheta's "been-to" novels or Obong's Garden 
House and Segun's The Third Dimple, a post-civil war text with a triangu-
lar setting i n Lagos, L o m e , and Paris. O r imagine the critical affiliation 
between Emecheta's autobiographical novels and Adenubi 's intimate 
biography of a male disabled but intelligently conversational ch i ld . In-
deed, the inclusion of The Third Dimple (published within the temporal 
focus of this book) would have sutured the canonical gap which its 
omission might have provoked. 
Without doubt, Chikwenye O . Ogunyemi has succeeded i n achiev-
ing a deliberate, methodical construction of a woman-centred vernac-
ular theory in reading the Nigerian novel by women. Africa Wo/Man 
Palava: The Nigerian Novel by Women has drawn o n a series of textual 
stitches to create a c o m m o n quilt of a womanist ideology i n Niger ian 
women's literature at the close of the twentieth century. 
ADEREMI RAJI-OYELADE 
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L i n d a H u t c h e o n . Irony's Edge: The Theory and Politics of Irony. New York: 
Routledge, 1995. Pp. ix, 248. $22.95 pk-
L i n d a H u t c h e o n has fashioned a career out of taking aim at moving 
targets. H e r books have often been attempts to define and discuss 
terms that are so widely and indiscriminately used that they have be-
come almost meaningless. She is certainly best known for her exten-
sive work on postmodernism, for instance, but she has also written 
about parody, on narrative self-reflexivity, on satire, and even about 
what it means to be Canadian. In fact, perhaps the biggest surprise 
about this particular book from H u t c h e o n is that it d i d not appear 
sooner. Irony's Edge is as engaging, interesting, wide-ranging, and pro-
vocative as one might expect new work from H u t c h e o n to be; further, 
it proclaims its topic to be "polit ical ," as one might also expect of a 
book o n irony by H u t c h e o n : i n a postmodern age, after al l , it is always 
political to be ironic , and ironic to be polit ical . 
For all of its virtues, however, Irony's Edge left me with a l inger ing im-
pression of distance and lack of involvement, a nagging doubt about 
why it is, i f irony is really always politically charged, i f it truly always has 
the "edge" that H u t c h e o n claims, that this book is itself neither inten-
tionally ironic n o r particularly polit ical . Whi le Irony's Edge is full o f so-
phisticated readings by H u t c h e o n , and absorbing discussions about 
why those readings legitimately detect or construct the various ironies 
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that they announce, the events that H u t c h e o n chooses to r e a d — f r o m 
a performance of a Wagner opera to an exhibit at the Royal Ontario 
Museum entitled Into the Heart of Africa—are uniformly local and dis-
concertingly distanced (even i f they can be read, finally, as "polit ical" 
i n some important senses). 
A l t h o u g h I think this book is well worth reading for its theoretical 
sweep alone, I r e c o m m e n d it with some qualifications. First, H u t c h e o n 
claims that irony is always both "polit ical" and "transideological" i n na-
ture. That is, irony potentially supports a variety of polit ical positions. 
H u t c h e o n writes that ever "since irony as a word and concept came to 
the attention of ancient Greek culture, there have been arguments 
about how irony works and what its scope is or could be" ( t o ) . Pre-
cisely that uncertainty is what has made it possible for "irony . . . [to] 
function tactically i n the service of a wide range of polit ical positions, 
legitimating or undercutt ing a wide variety of interests" ( r o ) . It may 
well be true that irony can support a "wide range of polit ical posi-
tions," but there are no readings here of texts that appear on their sur-
face to be radical but that, ironically, are shown to be reactionary at 
heart. As was true of her numerous readings of postmodernist texts, 
while H u t c h e o n makes n o d d i n g acknowledgement to other positions 
i n her readings, once ironies have been identified and decoded, they 
always turn out to be "subversive" i n a positive sense against prevail ing 
conservative ideologies. This tendency to identify the political posi-
tions of the text at hand with her own politics has always been a weak-
ness of Hutcheon's discussions of postmodernism (it has led, for 
example, to a far too easy use of the word "subvert"), and it is also a 
weakness i n Irony 's Edge. H u t c h e o n essentially became an apologist for 
postmodernism, defending its "subversive" political stance and radical 
nature against all opposit ion, whether her opponents were diametri-
cally opposed to her view (as was Charles Newman, who claims that 
postmodernism is fundamentally destructive and reactionary) or more 
complex and balanced (as was H a l Foster, who claims that postmoder-
nism is a complex matrix of radical and reactionary elements). 
H u t c h e o n is i n danger of becoming the same k i n d of apologist for 
irony here. 
My second qualification concerns definitions. H u t c h e o n claims, 
using the analog)' of expla ining a joke, that irony would not be irony i f 
it explained itself explicitly. 
I r o n y is a r e l a t i o n a l s t r a t e g y i n t h e s e n s e t h a t i t o p e r a t e s n o t o n l y b e t w e e n 
m e a n i n g s ( s a i d , u n s a i d ) b u t b e t w e e n p e o p l e ( i r o n i s t s , i n t e r p r e t e r s , t a r g e t s ) . 
I r o n i c m e a n i n g c o m e s i n t o b e i n g as t h e c o n s e q u e n c e o f a r e l a t i o n s h i p , a dy-
n a m i c , p e r f o r m a t i v e b r i n g i n g t o g e t h e r o f d i f f e r e n t m e a n i n g - m a k e r s , b u t 
a l s o o f d i f f e r e n t m e a n i n g s , first, i n o r d e r t o c r e a t e s o m e t h i n g n e w a n d , t h e n 
. . . t o e n d o w i t w i t h t h e c r i t i c a l e d g e o f j u d g m e n t . (58) 
At its most basic level, irony is defined in this book as a balance be-
tween the said and the unsaid. H u t c h e o n insists, to her credit, that 
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"you don't actually have to reject a ' l i teral ' meaning in order to get at 
what is usually called the ' i ronic ' or 'real ' meaning of the utterance" 
(60), but she does insist on the importance of the "unsaid" to render 
an articulation ironic . H u t c h e o n gives as an example the famous illus-
tration "Rabbit or Duck?" from Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investiga-
tions: "the figure can be interpreted as either a duck or a rabbit, 
depending on whether you see a bird's b i l l or a l o n g pair of ears i n the 
extended shape issuing from a central mass. . . . In interpreting irony, 
we can and do oscillate very rapidly between the said and the unsaid" 
(59-60). But there is no rabbit "said" and duck "unsaid" h e r e — t h e r e 
are (at least) two " saids," rabbit and duck. I would maintain (and I am 
not alone) that any a n d all discourse is precisely an oscil lation and a 
relationship between saids and unsaids (this is, after al l , one of the 
more important elements of Derrida's différance); I would maintain, 
further, that one of the features that makes irony difficult is exactly 
that it comprises two (or more) saids (each of which, of course, is i n 
turn a relationship between said and unsaid). In reading Wittgens-
tein's figure, there is no balance struck between said and unsaid: when 
I see Wittgenstein's i l lustration, I do not read it as a rabbit/non-duck, 
or as a duck/non-rabbit , but as a figure. If I were forced to p i n the fig-
ure down a n d compel led to choose whether the figure is duck or rab-
bit, I might have to balance one against the other and make a choice, 
but outside of such constraints, why do so? It seems to me that irony is 
a relationship between saids; it is a refusal to choose, a n d a license to 
not choose. T h e figure does not have to oscillate between exclusive 
meanings; it is, wonderfully, both and neither. T h e reading of the fig-
ure that detects irony is a reading that sees neither rabbit nor duck, 
but an illustration in which one c o u l d detect a rabbit or a duck, and 
can see the possibilities of each; the fact that those saids are held i n 
suspension is what makes the illustration a figure of irony. 
My third problem with this book lies i n the examples that H u t c h e o n 
chooses to read. H u t c h e o n announces her intention to make the sub-
ject of her book something that is composed, she says, o f "public mem-
ories," that together comprise a "shared discursive context": "World 
War II and . . . Nazi Germany" (6). This choice certainly helps to com-
pose a homogenous discursive community, but it seems to me that 
H u t c h e o n has stacked the deck unduly i n making her choices, a n d i n 
do ing so has moved away from irony or ambiguity, or f rom any real po-
litical involvement. As Harr ison F o r d memorably intones as Indiana 
Jones, "Nazis. I hate these guys"; or as W. J. T. M i t c h e l l writes in his 
provocative Picture Theory (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1994), "Fascism is 
a powerful word for terminating public discussion in Amer ica" (412). 
H u t c h e o n can safely assume that all "r ight-minded" people i n her au-
dience wil l deplore fascism. Further, as political as Into the Heart of Af-
rica may have been i n its own context, it is surely not the best example 
that H u t c h e o n could have chosen as the primary display i n a book on 
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the edginess and polit ical nature of irony. There is a multitude of po-
litical issues and very controversial publ ic literary and cultural artifacts 
that H u t c h e o n could have discussed, but she bas chosen instead to 
concentrate o n a single museum display, i n a single city, at several 
years' remove. Is Salman Rushdie's The Satanic Verses, on the other 
hand, ironic i n any important sense? If it is ironic, does it also carry 
some or al l of what H u t c h e o n herself argues is an integral part of 
i r o n y — a pejorative edge? Is it fair, then, to c laim that the M u s l i m 
leaders who c o n d e m n e d the book c o u l d be characterized as readers 
who lacked a sense of irony or play, who illegitimately overstepped a 
number of important bounds, but who rightly detected a negative 
judgment of culture and re l ig ion o n Rushdie's part when they saw it? 
That discussion has an edge: it is politically charged and risky ground. 
H u t c h e o n steers clear. 
In her work on postmodernism, H u t c h e o n has never been partic-
ularly postmodern herself. H e r scholarship is thorough-going, deliber-
ate, a n d generally marked by a certain k i n d of exhaustive referential 
care, but by none of the flash, dash, or dar ing pyrotechnic wordplay 
displayed by any of a n u m b e r of postmodernist literary theorists. She 
has always written about postmodernism, humour, and play i n a style 
that seems deliberately to avoid such excesses; she does the same thing 
here: 
t h i s is a b o o k about i r o n y , a n d n o t a n i r o n i c b o o k . . . . [ S o m e ] c o m m e n t a t o r s 
. . . h a v e w r i t t e n a b o u t i r o n y i n a d e l i b e r a t e l y a n d p o l e m i c a l l y u n s y s t e m a t i c 
a n d i r o n i z e d way. B e c a u s e o f b o t h p e r s o n a l i t y a n d w h a t t h e F r e n c h w o u l d 
c a l l m y o w n " d é f o r m a t i o n p r o f e s s i o n n e l l e , " I a d m i t t h a t . . . I ' m n o t t e r r i b l y 
c o m f o r t a b l e w i t h t h a t m o d e o f w r i t i n g , a n d so I h a v e c h o s e n a m o r e s y s t e m a -
t ic a p p r o a c h , w h i l e a c k n o w l e d g i n g t h r o u g h o u t t h e a r t i f i c i a l a n d e v e n , to 
s o m e e x t e n t , a r b i t r a r y s e p a r a t i o n o f a s p e c t s w h i c h , i n a c t u a l fac t , w o r k to-
g e t h e r s i m u l t a n e o u s l y t o m a k e i r o n y " h a p p e n . " (7) 
This book seems to me to be simply too safe. That safety is expressed 
in Hutcheon's determination not to attack any particular theory or 
theorist, not to be ironic , not to have the edge that she claims that 
irony must have. The result is an interesting, even a valuable book that 
could and probably should have been better. 
R ' S T E V E N D. SCOTT 
Jonathan Hart and Richard W. Bauman, eds. Explorations in Difference: 
Law, Culture, and Politics. Toronto: U of T o r o n t o P, tgg6. Pp. xiv, 
246. $55.00, $24.g5 pb. 
T h e eight essays i n this wildly eclectic col lection, which developed out 
of a conference of the same title given at the University of Alberta, are 
divided equally into two sections: "Theoretical Accounts" and "In-
stances." Ross Chambers opens the "Theoretical Accounts" section 
